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INTRODUCTION 
 
Failed intelligence—this term has been used 
to describe the perceived failures after a 
number of terrorist attacks including: the 
Madrid bombings on March 11, 2004 
(Carsten 2012), the London bombings on 
July 7, 2005 (Carsten 2012), the Paris attack 
on November 13, 2015 (MacAskill 2015), 
and the Brussels attack on March 22, 2016 
(Calamur 2016). The international news, 
media, and policy makers joined in on the 
hysteria, citing a need for better intelligence 
sharing among policing agencies (Walt 
2016). Largely, the conversation has been 
pointed towards European countries and 
their perceived lack of intelligence in affairs 
related to terrorism. More recently, a prime 
target has been Brussels’ internal police 
force. The story, however, is much more 
complicated. Intelligence difficulties do not 
only involve localized state forces, but also 
supranational organizations. More 
specifically in Europe, EUROPOL, the 
European Union’s law enforcement, has 
																																								 																				
1 This paper focuses on EUROPOL, though 
intelligence sharing is also carried out by other 
institutions including the European Union 
Intelligence and Situation Centre (also known as 
SITCEN). SITCEN and EUROPOL tend to share 
information, however, EUROPOL may be better 
positioned to enforce best practices at the EU level. 
been charged with intelligence gathering on 
issues related to terrorism.1 Despite the 
existence of such an agency, European 
intelligence gathering has been in disarray in 
practice. Dialogues with member states have 
been encouraged at the EU level, but better 
information sharing strategies among 
member states have yet to be created in 
practice.  
This research seeks to answer the 
question: “How can counterterrorism 
information best be shared in Europe?” This 
paper argues that cooperation enforced by a 
supranational entity is the best remedy for 
Europe’s information sharing problem. 
More specifically, this analysis argues that 
EUROPOL must be given more 
enforcement authority by the EU to truly 
better information sharing. The current 
system’s focus on member states has led to 
inaction and a reliance on information 
sharing platforms that suffer from security 
gaps, a problem based on the core question 
of protection national security. Instead, 
EUROPOL should be given more power to 
For example, EUROPOL is an older organization of 
the EU while SITCEN was created more recently in 
2011. In addition, the literature has been largely 
focused on EUROPOL as an actor in Europe’s 
counterterrorism efforts (Deflem 2006; Bures 2007; 
Argomaniz et al. 2015).  
mandate the use of INTERPOL’s Fixed 
INTERPOL Network Database/Mobile 
INTERPOL Network Database, as they have 
been shown to be effective in thwarting 
transnational terror at border checkpoints. 
This is the best way to combat informational 
disparities in discovering and stopping 
transnational terror incidents. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
INTERPOL’s MIND/FIND Platform 
in Global Intelligence Sharing  
 
INTERPOL aims to help support police 
worldwide. In this endeavor, it makes 
available technological tools to each of its 
member states (INTERPOL 2016). One of 
these technologies is INTERPOL’S 
MIND/FIND searchable database, created 
by INTERPOL in 2005 (Enders and Sandler 
2011). MIND stands for the Mobile 
INTERPOL Network Database and FIND 
stands for the Fixed INTERPOL Network 
Database. These systems “provide a 
technical solution for law enforcement 
officials in the member countries to access 
INTERPOL databases remotely, either as a 
‘fixed’ access point that can be integrated 
into an already existing national database 
system, or as a ‘mobile’ access point that 
permits autonomous queries on offline 
copies of INTERPOL databases” (Enders 
and Sandler 2011, 266).  
In 2015, scholars Gardeazable and 
Sandler (2016) sought to study the efficacy 
of the MIND/FIND platform as a 
counterterrorism tool. At this point, more 
than 100 member countries were connected 
to the MIND/FIND platform, including 
countries in Western Europe. Using a causal 
effects model, Gardeazable and Sandler’s 
key finding was that countries that adopted 
MIND/FIND “and also applied it to screen 
people and documents at border crossings 
and other key points suffered fewer 
transnational terrorist incidents than the 
control group, which either did not install 
MIND/FIND or else installed it but did not 
utilize it” (2015, 777). More specifically, a 
country like France “with 64 million people 
. . . in 2008, would on average experience 
0.32 fewer transnational terrorist incidents 
each year as a result of using” the 
MIND/FIND platform (Gardeazable and 
Sandler 2015, 777). They also noted, 
however, that many countries that were 
connected did not actually utilize 
MIND/FIND for searches.  
 
EUROPOL: A Eurocentric Agency 
 
In 2006, two scholars sought to study the 
power of EUROPOL as a stakeholder in the 
war against terror post-9/11. For example, 
Mathieu Deflem found that EUROPOL as 
an institution is highly bureaucratized 
(2006). In this assessment, Deflem argued 
that EUROPOL’s bureaucratization was an 
impediment to its counterterror efforts. Its 
life blood are the member states and its 
continued efficacy largely revolves around 
cooperation and synergy at the member state 
level. EUROPOL depends on the 
information received from the member 
states. 
Later, Oldrich Bures built on this 
research by discussing EU counterterrorism 
strategies in the context of negotiated policy 
agreements after 9/11 (2007). Bures argues 
that the member state-centric approach 
suffers from an implementation deficit. 
More specifically, he notes that EUROPOL 
has become a “paper tiger” in the EU when 
it comes to counterterrorism. Although 
EUROPOL has negotiated counterterror 
agreements on paper, little has been done in 
practice. Bures argues that this is likely 
because of a lack of “pro-integration 
thinking” in the member states (2007). On 
the ground level, member states have been 
unevenly applying counterterror measures, 
and national policing agencies and 
intelligence agencies are not cooperating 
with EUROPOL as they should. 
Furthermore, in an assessment of the current 
European counterterror situation, Argomaniz 
et al. describe a “running tension between 
the necessity to enhance cooperation and the 
reluctance of member states to relinquish 
competencies and, given the national 
security sensitivity of counter-terrorism,” 
member states have generally tightly 
constrained the EU’s role (2015, 191).  
 
METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
 
I consulted the annual EUROPOL 
publication, “The European Union 
Terrorism and Situation Trend Report (TE-
SAT).” These annual reports represent the 
terrorist threat situation in the European 
Union, along with identifying intelligence 
operations designed to thwart these threats. 
In each report, I marked whether 
“INTERPOL” or INTERPOL’s intelligence 
service, “MIND/FIND,” was mentioned to 
gage INTERPOL’s importance vis-à-vis 
EUROPOL. I also queried these publications 
for mentions of European member states and 
their information sharing patterns to the 
same effect. I hypothesized that member 
state systems would be mentioned more than 
INTERPOL or INTERPOL systems.	
Column 1 of Table 1 depicts the total 
of number of EUROPOL TE-SAT reports 
consulted in this paper. Columns 2 and 3 
illustrate the results of a word search in each 
of the ten TE-SAT reports. INTERPOL was 
directly mentioned a total of three times 
from 2007-2016, once in 2011, 2012, and 
2016. INTERPOL’s MIND/FIND, however, 
was never mentioned in any of the TE-SAT 
reports. Domestic information sharing with 
EUROPOL from member states was 
mentioned in each TE-SAT Report, 
supporting my hypothesis. Thus, even when 
INTERPOL was mentioned, domestic 
information sharing would also be 
mentioned.  
 
Table 1: Total Number of INTERPOL 
Mentions vs. EU Member State 
Capabilities Mentioned 
Total 
Num
ber 
of 
TE-
SAT 
Repo
rts 
INTER
POL 
Mentio
ned 
INTERP
OL’s 
MIND/FI
ND 
Mentione
d 
Membe
r State 
Informa
tion 
Sharing 
Mentio
ned 
10 3 0 10 
Note: This table shows the total number 
of direct mentions of INTERPOL, 
MIND/FIND, and member state 
intelligence in all ten TE-SAT reports 
from 2007-2016.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
How can counterterrorism information 
sharing be best improved in Europe? This 
research has uncovered some elements that 
could shed light on answering this question. 
Querying EUROPOL’s TE-SAT reports 
supports the idea that information sharing 
focuses on the compliance of individual 
member states and not multinational 
institutions like INTERPOL. This research 
also supports that INTERPOL’s expertise is 
sometimes used, but this pales in 
comparison to the leverage given to member 
states’ compliance with information sharing.  
The findings bring to light two issues 
elucidated in the literature: (1) EUROPOL is 
a counterterrorism fighter on paper, but not 
in action (Bures 2015, 57) and (2) European 
member states are placing more reliance in 
domestic systems, rather than supranational 
powers like EUROPOL (Argomaniz et. al 
2015, 197). For example, the TE-SAT 
reports showed reliance on the reporting of 
member states for the study. If data was not 
taken directly from a member state, it would 
be crosschecked by the member state. This 
is not only for the assurances of “accuracy” 
but also a continuous example of autonomy 
concerns in the EU. Even as it concerns 
national security, largely a good shared by 
all despite land borders, EUROPOL is still 
deferring to its member states. This is a 
problem because member states, when it 
comes to national security, are not the best 
at implementing counterterrorism policies 
(Argomaniz et. al 2015, 198). Thus, 
EUROPOL has taken a “backseat” and 
allowed much of the work to be done by 
member states whose information sharing 
regimes are largely imperfect.  
Furthermore, the findings and literature 
illustrate that practically, INTERPOL’s 
MIND/FIND technology is still not a 
contender in EU information sharing. 
Despite quantitatively supported evidence of 
MIND/FIND’s efficacy in fighting terror, 
counterterrorism information sharing is 
subject to the will of the sovereign states at 
the EU level. Evidence of non-use of the 
MIND/FIND technology may be explained 
by the plethora of information sharing 
platforms available to member states at the 
EU level, particularly systems like the 
Schengen Information System, (“SIS”). 
Even then, these platforms have not been 
subject to large-scale study and suffer from 
various security gaps. However, there may 
be alternative reasons behind these 
phenomena. For example, perhaps a 
different system is needed to measure 
INTERPOL’s importance in information 
sharing. The TE-SAT reports may not be 
best because they give a broad overview of 
the threat situation in Europe. In doing so, 
they focus not just on how they received the 
information but also on the effect of 
information sharing in thwarting terror 
threats. Future research may seek to gain 
access to more practical documentation of 
the number of queries made in INTERPOL 
systems in the EU versus domestic systems 
used by each respective member state.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Based on the findings and a review of the 
literature, this paper makes the following 
recommendations for future action within 
the European Union: 
 
1. The European Commission 
must give EUROPOL more 
power to enforce efficient 
information sharing programs 
among the member states and 
2. EUROPOL member states 
must preference use of 
INTERPOL MIND/FIND 
systems when conducting 
border checks. The EU 
agency, FRONTEX, should 
be charged with ensuring that 
MIND/FIND is used at 
border zones. 
 
This two-pronged recommendation 
offers a more concrete plan that is in line 
with the aims of the Bratislava Roadmap. 
More specifically, concerning internal 
security, this recommendation will best 
“intensif[y] cooperation and information-
exchange among security services of the 
Member states” (Council of the European 
Union 2016, 4). Giving EUROPOL concrete 
enforcement authority against non-
implementing states will best spur action, 
remediating Europe’s cooperation problem 
and the use of INTERPOL’s MIND/FIND 
will lead to more measurable results in the 
long-run.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Best information sharing practices in Europe 
should include concrete enforcement for 
non-implementing states and tested 
information sharing platforms like that of 
INTERPOL’s MIND/FIND. This paper has 
studied the effects of EUROPOL’s 
perceived lack of power in the 
counterterrorism space. This is due to the 
continued pull that member states have in 
the area of national security. To move 
beyond this impediment to cooperation, the 
EU must give EUROPOL more power to 
mandate the use of the MIND/FIND system 
to aid in thwarting transnational terror.  
Though this paper’s recommendation 
seeks to prevent terrorist attacks through 
information sharing, this does not mean that 
other methods should not be used in the long 
run. Preventative approaches to 
transnational terror can also include 
local/national programs aimed at 
understanding why people are radicalized in 
the first place before they are caught in the 
intelligence sharing “net.” Future research 
may seek to study the efficacy of anti-
radicalization programs in the EU vis-à-vis 
intelligence sharing programs in thwarting 
terrorism. Still, at this point in history, 
improving information sharing proves to be 
an important endeavor.  
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